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Abstract
We study the problem of learning data representations that
are private yet informative, i.e., providing information about
intended “ally” targets while obfuscating sensitive “adver-
sary” attributes. We propose a novel framework, Exclusion-
Inclusion Generative Adversarial Network (EIGAN), that
generalizes existing adversarial privacy-preserving represen-
tation learning (PPRL) approaches to generate data encodings
that account for multiple possibly overlapping ally and adver-
sary targets. Preserving privacy is even more difficult when
the data is collected across multiple distributed nodes, which
for privacy reasons may not wish to share their data even for
PPRL training. Thus, learning such data representations at
each node in a distributed manner (i.e., without transmitting
source data) is of particular importance. This motivates us to
develop D-EIGAN, the first distributed PPRL method, based
on federated learning with fractional parameter sharing to ac-
count for communication resource limitations. We theoreti-
cally analyze the behavior of adversaries under the optimal
EIGAN and D-EIGAN encoders, and consider the impact of
dependencies among ally and adversary tasks on the encoder
performance. Our experiments on real-world and synthetic
datasets demonstrate the advantages of EIGAN encodings in
terms of accuracy, robustness, and scalability; in particular,
we show that EIGAN outperforms the previous state-of-the-
art by a significant accuracy margin (47% improvement). The
experiments further reveal that D-EIGAN’s performance is
consistent with EIGAN under different node data distribu-
tions and is resilient to communication constraints.
1 Introduction
Training machine learning (ML) models frequently requires
sharing data among multiple parties, e.g., cloud services ag-
gregating data from multiple users to learn a global model.
Such sharing naturally raises privacy concerns (Chakraborty
et al. 2013; Saleheen et al. 2016) in terms of exposing sen-
sitive attributes in datasets. Even when data is anonymized
at the source, de-anonymization attacks are possible when
coupled with auxiliary datasets, as was famously shown in
the Netflix challenge (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008). One
of the most widely used techniques for obfuscating sensi-
tive attributes in data is differential privacy (DP) (Dwork
et al. 2006). DP is a context-agnostic technique that sys-
tematically introduces noise (e.g., Laplace or Gaussian) into
the dataset and provides security guarantees such as -
differential-privacy and k-anonymity (Li, Li, and Venkata-
subramanian 2007) on the aggregated datasets. While effec-
tive at privacy preservation on groups of data records, even
a small amount of injected noise significantly impacts ML
training and inference (Tossou and Dimitrakakis 2017). This
makes record-level privacy unsuitable in scenarios where a
few attributes need to be obfuscated while sharing the record
for model training. For example, while sharing patient vi-
tals for preventive healthcare (Henry et al. 2015; Bates et al.
2014), both privacy (gender, ethnicity anonymization) and
predictivity (confident diagnosis inference) are important.
The drawbacks of such context-agnostic privacy measures
have motivated research in privacy-preserving representa-
tion learning (PPRL) (Yang et al. 2018). PPRL exploits the
knowledge of sensitive attributes in a dataset and consid-
ers privacy and predictivity as joint and (likely) competing
model objectives. It learns a transformation of source data
that balances the goals of (i) obfuscating sensitive attributes
of interest to an “adversary” while (ii) preserving predictiv-
ity on intended targets for an “ally” (Ganin et al. 2016).
Current literature on PPRL assumes the existence of a
single sensitive attribute in a centrally aggregated dataset.
However, most real-world datasets have multiple sensitive
attributes and are distributed across multiple locations. Con-
sider healthcare records, for example: these are (i) spread
across regions and countries, (ii) comprised of potentially
multiple sensitive attributes, such as mental health, gen-
der, ethnicity, etc., and (iii) governed by regulations that
vary from one region to another, e.g., while GDPR (in Eu-
rope) considers racial/ethnic origin as sensitive information,
HIPAA (in USA) does not. These challenges call for a gen-
eralized and distributed PPRL that takes into account multi-
ple sensitive attributes, trains on distributed data, and learns
representations that incorporate privacy/predictivity goals of
individual nodes. Such distributed techniques should more-
over be communication resource-efficient.
In this paper, we propose a novel PPRL architec-
ture called Exclusion-Inclusion Generative Adversarial Net-
works (EIGAN), which addresses the aforementioned chal-
lenges overlooked by the prior works. Structurally motivated
by GANs (Goodfellow et al. 2014), which have achieved re-
cent success in several fields (e.g., image translation (Isola
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Figure 1: (a) Architecture of a single EIGAN node, consisting
of an encoder, n ally, and m adversary networks. (b) D-EIGAN
system for distributed EIGAN training, consisting of K different
EIGAN nodes, each with their own subset of the full dataset. The
nodes must coordinate their local encodings via a parameter server.
et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2017), video prediction (Vondrick,
Pirsiavash, and Torralba 2016), and super-resolution (Ledig
et al. 2017)), EIGAN is a generalized game-theoretic PPRL
technique designed to generate encodings “inclusive” of sig-
nals that are of utility to a set of allies, while “exclusive”
of signals that can be used by adversaries to recover sen-
sitive attributes. Further, to address the privacy vulnerabili-
ties and communication constraints of pooling raw data, we
develop D-EIGAN, where multiple EIGAN nodes train en-
coders on their local datasets and synchronize their model
parameters, as depicted in Fig. 1. The D-EIGAN architec-
ture implements distributed training without noticeable per-
formance degradation compared to the centralized EIGAN,
while accounting for realistic factors of communication con-
traints and differing data distributions across nodes.
Related work. Recent works in PPRL (Yang et al.
2018; Roy and Boddeti 2019; Sadeghi, Yu, and Bod-
deti 2019; Raval, Machanavajjhala, and Cox 2017; Wu
et al. 2018) have proposed centralized architectures that
jointly maximize the loss in predicting sensitive attributes
while minimizing the loss of target task prediction. Specifi-
cally, (Yang et al. 2018) proposed a three-network encoder-
ally-adversary architecture and showed experimentally that
the achievable tradeoff between the two objectives is better
than that provided by the privacy budget in DP. In (Roy and
Boddeti 2019), the problem was formulated as a non-zero-
sum game between the three networks to minimize infor-
mation leakage in encoded image representations. (Sadeghi,
Yu, and Boddeti 2019) considered a minimax optimization
between three networks, and focused on strong theoreti-
cal properties to derive closed-form solutions that can be
achieved when the networks are linear mappings.
Recently, (Bertran et al. 2019) pursued an information-
theoretic approach that views PPRL as minimization of the
utility lost in the learned representation, subject to an upper
bound on mutual information between the output representa-
tion and the sensitive attribute. Similarly, (Huang et al. 2018;
Tripathy, Wang, and Ishwar 2019) take an information-
theoretic approach to formulate the minimax problem in
terms of KL-divergence. EIGAN, on the other hand, con-
siders a log-loss formulation promoting interpretability and
training stability (discussed in Sec. 2.1). Further, EIGAN
generalizes PPRL to multiple allies/adversaries and dis-
tributed training, and beats the state-of-the-art (Bertran et al.
2019) by a considerable margin.
There are two other directions of work in adversar-
ial learning related to PPRL. One addresses privacy-
preservation through synthetic data generation (Jordon,
Yoon, and van der Schaar 2018; Xu et al. 2018), which dif-
fers from EIGAN’s goal of learning a data transformation.
The other is fair representation learning (Brkic et al. 2017;
Oh et al. 2016; Song et al. 2019; Edwards and Storkey 2016;
Kusner et al. 2017), where the objective is to learn represen-
tations that are intrinsically fair (on a single attribute) on the
downstream training tasks in terms of demographic parity
(Madras et al. 2018).
Contributions. Our contributions are summarized below:
1. We introduce EIGAN (Sec. 2.1) that generalizes PPRL to
arbitrary numbers of allies and adversaries aiming to infer
potentially overlapping tasks. We prove that EIGAN’s en-
coder utility is maximized if the adversary outputs follow
a uniform distribution, and consider the effect of correla-
tions between ally and adversary objectives (Prop. 1).
2. To the best of our knowledge, D-EIGAN (Sec. 2.2) is the
first technique for distributed training of PPRL models.
We show that when the nodes engaged in the training
possess i.i.d. datasets, the objective of D-EIGAN exhibits
similar properties to EIGAN (Prop. 3).
3. Our experiments (Sec. 3) reveal that EIGAN significantly
outperforms the state-of-the-art in PPRL (Tab. 1, Fig. 4)
and is robust to the choice of adversary architectures
(Tab. 2). We also demonstrate that D-EIGAN matches the
performance of EIGAN even as the number of nodes in-
crease (Fig. 5), and is robust to the distribution of ally and
adversary objectives across the nodes (Fig. 6). We further
show the resilience of D-EIGAN under communication
restrictions in the system that call for partial parameter
sharing and delayed model aggregations (Fig. 7).
2 EIGAN Formulation and Model Learning
We begin in Sec. 2.1 with the centralized EIGAN formula-
tion, and derive properties of the solution. Then, we extend it
to distributed learning case and design D-EIGAN in Sec. 2.2.
Due to page constraints, the proofs of all propositions are
deferred to Sec. A6 of Appendix.
2.1 EIGAN: Centralized Model Architecture
We first consider a system consisting of n allies, indexed by
A1, ..., An; and m adversaries, indexed by V1, ..., Vm. Ally
Ai is characterized by model parameters θAi and a set of tar-
get attributes/labels YAi following distribution YAi . Ai aims
to associate each input sample with its corresponding target
attribute in YAi . Similarly, adversary Vj parameterized by
θVj wishes to associate input samples with a set of (known)
sensitive attributes/labels YVj following distribution YVj .
The goal of EIGAN is to learn an encoder E parameter-
ized by θE that maximizes the performance of A1, ..., An
while minimizing the performance of V1, ..., Vm. The en-
coder has access to a centrally-located dataset X for model
training consisting of N samples, where each sample in
the dataset is represented as a d-dimensional feature vector
xj ∈ Rd, j = 1, ..., N . Let E(x; θE) denote the output of
the encoder for a data sample x realized via the learning pa-
rameters θE .E is in general a non-linear differentiable func-
tion (e.g., a neural network) E(x; θE) : Rd → Rl, ∀x, θE ,
where l is the dimension of the representation output by the
encoder, and typically l ≤ d.
The encoded representation E(x; θE) is what the allies
A1, ..., An and adversaries V1, ..., Vm are provided with for
their tasks for a given x ∈ X , as depicted in Fig. 1(a). We
quantify the utility functions of the allies and adversaries as:
uAi = EY∼YAi
[
log
(
pAi (Y |E(X ; θE))
)]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
uVj = EY∼YVj
[
log
(
pVj (Y |E(X ; θE))
)]
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
(1)
where p
Ai
(Y |E(X ; θE)) and pVj (Y |E(X ; θE)) denote the
probabilities of successful inference of target labels Y ∼
YAi and sensitive labels Y ∼ YVj for ally Ai and adver-
sary Vj , respectively, over the outputs that the encoder E
provides for the dataset X . This leads to our minimax game
among three types of players, in which two (the encoder and
allies) are colluding against the third (the adversary). Specif-
ically, we formulate the following optimization problem:
min
θV ={θVj }mj=1
max
θE ,θA={θAi}ni=1
U(θE , θA, θV ), (2)
where
U(θE , θA, θV ) =
n∑
i=1
αAiuAi −
m∑
j=1
αVj uVj . (3)
Here, α
Ai
, α
Vj
> 0 denote normalized importance
parameters placed on each objective such that∑n
i=1 αAi +
∑m
j=1 αVj = 1. Similar to the encoder,
we assume that the ally and adversary predictors are
non-linear, differentiable functions. In this way, the encoder
in (2) seeks to maximize the achievable utility of the allies
while minimizing those of the adversaries.
Intuitively, the encoder will attempt to diminish the ad-
versary predictions to a random guess, i.e., to a uniform di-
stirbution over its target labels (Abadi and Andersen 2016).
This may be difficult to achieve, however, when the inter-
ests of the allies and adversaries are related, which makes
the weights α
Ai
, α
Vj
important to the minimax solution in
(2). The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Proposition 1. Let O denote the set of all (i, j) pairs of
allies Ai and adversaries Vj for which YAi ∩ YVj 6= ∅, i.e.,
with overlapping interests. Given a fixed encoder E in the
EIGAN architecture, if O = ∅, the overall score in (2) is
maximized when the adversaries’ output predictions follow
a uniform distribution. On the other hand, if O 6= ∅, then
for each overlapping label, the architecture proposed by (2)
considers the utility of the attributes that have the higher
importance weight, i.e., Ai if αAi > αVj and Vj if αAi <
αVj .
Prop. 1 shows that given an encoded representation, if
the allies and adversaries possess non-overlapping interests,
then a uniform prediction distribution among the sensitive
Figure 2: (a) Synthetic dataset with eight groups of points, two
allies, and one adversary. The allies are interested in separating be-
tween color pairs (the two horizontal axes), and the adversary is
interested in classifying shapes (the vertical axis). (b) EIGAN’s en-
coding has collapsed the adversary dimension.
parameters of interest of the adversaries is adopted by the
optimal solution. This resembles the initial GAN result in
(Goodfellow et al. 2014) obtained for a two-network archi-
tecture. In Sec. A8.4 of Appendix, we consider a real-world
experiment with such overlapping interests and find that the
encoder loss is unable to balance the objectives when the im-
portance weights are equal. It is worth noting that the anal-
ysis on expected posterior distribution (estimated by neural
networks) here or on mutual information in (Bertran et al.
2019) relate directly to interpretable metrics such as accu-
racy (Bassily et al. 2018) and generalization error (Feder and
Merhav 1994), instead of the worst case guarantees provided
by context-agnostic privacy frameworks such as DP.
In practice, coincidental overlaps between ally and adver-
sary interests would be relatively rare, but this provides a
way for an adversary to deliberately disrupt the system by
mimicking an ally. Relationships between the interests, on
the other hand, might happen if we do not know a priori that
an ally and an adversary are correlated. In this case, EIGAN
must balance between predictivity and privacy, which leads
to different ally and adversary outputs described in Prop. 1.
We consider EIGAN’s characteristics when there is a linear
relationship between the target distribution of an ally and an
adversary in Prop. 2 (refer to Sec. A5.2 of Appendix).
Model training. We train the encoder and the al-
lies/adversaries in EIGAN by alternately updating their pa-
rameters using iterative minibatch stochastic gradient de-
scent (SGD) to minimize their log-loss functions. For the
encoder, we define the log-loss LE for a single training in-
stance as a weighted combination of the predictive capability
of the allies and adversaries as
LE =
n∑
i=1
−〈yAi , log yˆAi〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
log-loss of allyAi ,LAi
−α ·
m∑
j=1
−〈yVj , log yˆVj 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
log-loss of adversary Vj ,LVj
, (4)
where 〈., .〉 denotes inner product, and log is an element-
wise operator. yAi and yVj are the binary vector represen-
tations of the true class label of interest for ally Ai and
adversary Vj , respectively, while yˆAi and yˆVi are the vec-
tors of soft predictions (i.e., probabilities) for each class.
Here, we have made the simplifications α
Ai
= α/n ∀i and
α
Vj
= (1 − α)/m ∀j, where α ∈ (0, 1) is tuned to em-
phasize either predictivity (higher α) or privacy (lower α).
Objective Unencoded Bertran EIGAN Improvement
Ally: Identity
0.9750 0.5580 0.8203 47.01%
(top-5 accuracy)
Adv: Gender
0.9872 0.6814 0.6762
Controlled
(accuracy) to be equal
Table 1: Performance comparison between EIGAN and the state-
of-the-art (Bertran et al. 2019) on FaceScrub dataset. We observe
that for the same performance on the adversary (Adv.) objective,
EIGAN is able to obtain a substantial improvement over (Bertran
et al. 2019) on the ally objective (in Improvement column).
In each epoch, we average LE over a minibatch of size J to
obtain an estimate of (1), and update θE based on the gradi-
ent. Then, we update the θAi and θVi according to (4). For
the full algorithm, see Alg. A1 in Sec. A6 of Appendix.
Alternative objectives to (4) can be found in PPRL litera-
ture. In particular, recent works (Huang et al. 2018; Tripathy,
Wang, and Ishwar 2019; Bertran et al. 2019) formulate the
adversarial loss w.r.t. KL divergence. Our choice of log-loss
over KL-divergence is based on the facts that: (i) KL diver-
gence fails to give meaningful value under disjoint distribu-
tions (Adler and Lunz 2018), and thus is less interpretable,
and (ii) log-loss is more stable under varying priors during
training, which is important in the EIGAN scenario since
training data is affected by mini-batches, non-i.i.d distribu-
tions, and the evolving representations. Our experimental re-
sults in Tab. 1 validate the improvement over the recent state
of the art (discussed further in Sec. 3.1).
Visual demonstration. Fig. 2 gives a visual demonstra-
tion of EIGAN’s trained representation on a synthetic 3-
dimensional dataset. There are two allies A1 and A2 which
are each interested in separating data points along one of the
horizontal axes, and an adversary V that is interested in sep-
aration along the vertical axis. We see in (b) that EIGAN
encoding collapses the data along the vertical axis while re-
taining separability in the other two dimensions. Other vi-
sual demonstrations are included in Sec. A7 of Appendix.
2.2 D-EIGAN: Distributed Adversarial Learning
The distributed setting for EIGAN (D-EIGAN) is de-
picted in Fig. 1(b). There are K nodes in the sys-
tem, denoted E(1), ..., E(K). Each node E(k) has a set
of allies, denoted A(k)1 , ..., A
(k)
n(k) with target label sets
YA(k) = {YA(k)1 , ..., YA(k)n(k)}, a set of adversaries, denoted
V
(k)
1 , ..., V
(k)
m(k) with target sets YV (k) = {YV (k)1 , ..., YV (k)m(k)},
and a subset Xk ⊂ X of Nk datapoints from the over-
all dataset of N samples. These local datasets are non-
overlapping, and may differ in size. While the specific al-
lies and adversaries may differ at each node, the ultimate
goal is to train a global model that maximizes all allies’
and minimizes all adversaries’ performances. Nevertheless,
since sharing the raw datasets could potentially leak sensi-
tive information, each node E(k) will train its own local en-
coderE(k)(x; θE(k)), and the server in Fig. 1(b) will period-
ically aggregate the locally-trained models.
Algorithm 1 D-EIGAN training
Notation:
• θE denotes the global parameter vector
•Qk denotes uniformly random choice of indices at node E(k)
• θ˜E(k) denotes the parameter vector recovered at the server for
encoder E(k), with its qth element denoted θ˜E(k)(q).
• φ denotes the fraction of parameters shared
• δ denotes the number of epochs between aggregations
• (·)j denotes the value for the jth minibatch
• L
A
(k)
i
and L
V
(k)
i
denote the loss of ally A(k)i and adversary
V
(k)
i at node E(k)
• ηE , ηA , and ηV denote the learning rates
Aggregation at Parameter Server:
• initialize parameter θE
for each update round do
• Update parameter vector: θE ←∑Kk=1 NkN θ˜E(k)
end for
Local Training at Node E(k):
• Initialize
{
θ
A
(k)
i
}n(k)
i=1
and
{
θ
V
(k)
j
}m(k)
j=1
• Download initial θE from parameter server
for number of training epochs do
• After δ epochs, update φ · |θE(k) | randomly chosen param-
eters from parameter server: θE(k)(q) = θE(q) if q ∈ Q
• Sample a minibatch J of datapoints from local dataset Xk
• Compute encoder loss LE(k) using (4)
• Update encoder: θE(k) ← θE(k) − ηE · ∇θE(k)LE(k)
• Compute ally/adversary losses in (4)
• Update ally/adversary parameters: θ
A
(k)
i
← θ
A
(k)
i
− ηA ·
∇θ
A
(k)
i
L
A
(k)
i
, θ
V
(k)
i
← θ
V
(k)
i
− ηV · ∇θ
V
(k)
i
L
V
(k)
i
• After δ epochs, upload φ · |θE(k) | encoder parameters at
random: θ˜E(k)(q) = θE(k)(q) if q ∈ Qk, else θ˜E(k)(q) = 0
end for
The utility function for node E(k) is defined as
U (k)(θE(k) , θA(k) , θV (k)) =
n∑
i=1
α
A
(k)
i
u
A
(k)
i
−
m∑
j=1
α
V
(k)
j
u
V
(k)
j
,
(5)
where θA(k) =
{
θ
A
(k)
i
}n(k)
i=1
and θV (k) =
{
θ
V
(k)
j
}m(k)
j=1
de-
note the sets of ally and adversary parameters at node E(k),
and u
A
(k)
i
, u
V
(k)
j
denote the utility functions of A(k)i , V
(k)
j
defined analogous to (1). α
A
(k)
i
, α
V
(k)
j
> 0 denote the
normalized importance parameters for node E(k), where∑n
i=1 αA(k)i
+
∑m
j=1 αV (k)j
= 1. This leads to the follow-
ing minimax game for the distributed case:
min
SV
max
SE ,SA
1
K
K∑
k=1
U (k)(θE(k) , θA(k) , θV (k))
s.t. θE(k) = θE(k′) , k 6= k′, 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K,
(6)
where SV = {θV (k)}Kk=1 ,SE = {θE(k)}Kk=1 ,SA =
{θA(k)}Kk=1. The constraint in (6) ensures that the optimal
encoder is the same across all nodes, even though each node
may have different allies and adversaries. In this way, an en-
coded datapoint E(k)(x; θE) at node k could be transferred
to another node k′ and applied to a taskA(k
′)
i there privately.
Distributed model learning. To solve (6) in a distributed
manner, we develop a variant of federated learning. Different
from standard implementations, in our setting, there is both
a global model (encoder) and individual local models (allies
and adversaries) to be learned (Smith et al. 2017).
D-EIGAN consists of two steps repeated in sequence un-
til convergence. The first is local updating, in which each
E(k) conducts a series of δ minibatch SGD iterations. For
each minibatch, training proceeds as in the centralized case,
with the encoder, allies, and adversaries parameters updated
via SGD to minimize the log-losses L(k)E , L(k)Ai , and L
(k)
Vj
de-
fined as in (4) but in this case for each node. The second step
is global aggregation, in which each E(k) uploads its locally-
trained encoder to the parameter server to construct a global
version, after every δ SGD iterations. We introduce a sparsi-
fication technique here in which each node selects a fraction
φ of its parameters at random to upload for each aggregation.
LettingQk be the indices chosen by E(k), then the vector re-
covered at the server is θ˜E(k) where θ˜E(k)(q) = θE(k)(q)
if q ∈ Qk and 0 otherwise. With this, the global aggrega-
tion becomes a weighted average θE =
∑
k
Nk
N θ˜E(k) . Then,
the server also selects a fraction φ of indices at random to
synchronize each node k with on the downlink. Letting Q
be the indices selected, then each k sets θE(k)(q) = θE(q) if
q ∈ Q, and makes no change to the qth parameter otherwise.
The pseudo-code of our algorithm is given in Alg. 1.
The synchronization frequency δ and sparsification fac-
tor φ are directly related to the amount of (encoded) data
transferred through the system within a fixed period of time:
as δ increases, uplink transfers to the server occur less fre-
quently, and as φ decreases, each uplink and downlink trans-
mission require fewer communication resources. This is an
important consideration in contemporary networking appli-
cations where the nodes may be user devices communi-
cating over a resource-constrained wireless channel (Wang
et al. 2019; McMahan et al. 2017). Fractional parameter
sharing is similar to pruning (both choose a subset of pa-
rameters), and mimics the additive-noise mechanism in DP
(Huang et al. 2020) on model weights, minimizing leakage
(Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015; Shokri et al. 2017)
w.r.t. exposed model parameters during distributed training.
We study the effect of δ and φ on the performance of D-
EIGAN in Sec. 3.2.
In D-EIGAN, the allies and adversaries may differ at each
node, and each node trains an individual local encoder. Since
the encoder parameters are globally synchronized, however,
the local encoder implicitly trains using global union of al-
lies/adversaries across nodes. In the case that the nodes have
same objectives and i.i.d. datasets, we show that D-EIGAN
yields the same properties as Prop. 1:
Proposition 3. Given a set of fixed encoders in the D-
EIGAN architecture, if all the nodes have the same number
of allies and adversaries with the same sets of target labels
YA(k) = YA(k′) and YV (k) = YV (k′) , 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K, then
Prop. 1 holds for all the allies and adversaries belonging to
different nodes if the local datasets at each node are i.i.d.
When the nodes have different objectives, the importance
of each objective is proportional to the number of nodes im-
plementing it; see Prop. 4 in Sec. A5.4 of Appendix.
3 Experimental Evaluation
We now turn to an experimental evaluation of our methodol-
ogy. We analyze EIGAN’s convergence characteristics and
compare its performance with relevant baselines in Sec. 3.1,
and evaluate D-EIGAN compared to the centralized case and
as the system characteristics change in Sec. 3.2.
Datasets and model objectives. We consider three real-
world datasets: MNIST (LeCun and Cortes 2010), MIMIC-
III (Johnson et al. 2016) and FaceScrub (Ng and Winkler
2014). MNIST consists of 60,000 handwritten digits with
labels 0 − 9. MIMIC has medical information for hospital
admissions with attributes such as patient vitals, demograph-
ics, and medication; we obtain a dataset consisting of 58,976
admission data points by joining multiple tables on patient
IDs. Facescrub is an image dataset with over 22,000 images
of celebrities with identity and gender labels. In MIMIC, we
consider survival (2-class) as the ally objective, while gen-
der (2-class) and race (3-class) are taken as adversary ob-
jectives. In the FaceScrub dataset, the ally objective is user
identity (200-class), and the adversary objective is gender
(2-class). In MNIST, we consider whether a digit is even
or odd (2-class) as the ally objective, and the label of the
digit (10-class) as the adversary objective. We also gen-
erate synthetic Gaussian datasets to analyse the effect of
ally/adversary class overlap in some experiments.
Implementation. We employ fully connected networks
(FCNs) for the encoder, allies, and adversaries in experi-
ments on MIMIC and the synthetic datasets. The FCN en-
coder uses ReLU (Nair and Hinton 2010) activation for hid-
den layers and tanh activation for the final fully-connected
layer, whereas the ally and adversaries use sigmoid acti-
vation in the final layer. We use dropout (Srivastava, Hin-
ton, Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Salakhutdinov 2014) and
L2-regularization to prevent network overfitting. For Face-
Scrub, we employ U-Net (Ronneberger, Fischer, and Brox
2015) for the encoder and Xception-Net (Chollet 2017) for
the ally/adversary, as in (Bertran et al. 2019). Unless oth-
erwise stated, we set α = 0.5 in EIGAN/D-EIGAN (i.e.,
equal privacy/predictivity importance). We train to minimize
cross-entropy loss over 70/30 training/test splits on a system
with 8GB graphics (NVIDIA RTX 4000) and 64 GB RAM.
Baselines. We consider four baseline encoders: princi-
pal component analysis (PCA) (Abdi and Williams 2010),
autoencoders (Kramer 1991), differential privacy (DP), and
the method in (Bertran et al. 2019). Autoencoders and PCA
preserve information content and do not have explicit pri-
vacy objectives; they are therefore expected to give encoded
data that has good predictivity. As discussed in Sec. 1, DP is
widely used for context-agnostic privacy preservation. PCA
is configured to the number of components retaining 99% of
the variance, and we train the autoencoder to transform data
Figure 3: Predictivity and privacy comparison between EIGAN
and baselines on the MIMIC dataset. (a) On the adversary objec-
tives (gender prediction, solid lines and race prediction, dashed
lines) EIGAN matches DP’s performance (by design of the ex-
periment). Hence, the red and the yellow curves overlap. (b) On
the ally objective (survival prediction), EIGAN achieves notice-
able improvement over the baselines.
Figure 4: Effect of varying the ally class overlap (by changing
the variances of synthetic Gaussian data) on the performance of
EIGAN, the method in (Bertran et al. 2019), and the unencoded
data. (a) and (b) plot the achieved accuracies of the adversary and
ally objectives, respectively. EIGAN is able to consistently outper-
form both baselines on the adversary objective, and obtains perfor-
mance close to the unencoded data for the ally.
Figure 5: Comparison of (a) adversary and (b) ally performance as
the number of nodes in the system is increased from K = 2 to 10,
for D-EIGAN (φ, δ = 1), EIGAN, and unencoded. Node k’s data
is generated from four Gaussians centered on a unit square, each
with σ2 = 0.1k, i.e., increasing variance. (c) visualizes the ally
(reds vs. blues) and adversary (x’s vs. o’s) objectives on the data
for k = 3. As expected, the ally in each case performs worse with
higher K, but D-EIGAN is able to match EIGAN’s performance.
to the same dimensional space as PCA. For DP, we employ
the Laplace mechanism (Yang et al. 2018). (Bertran et al.
2019) is the most recent state-of-the-art in adversarial PPRL;
in this case, we use their open-source implementation (Mar-
tinBertran 2019) and compare on the setting described in
their paper.
All of our code and trained models are available at (Elided
2020). For each of the following experiments, the reported
log-loss and/or accuracy are given for the test sets.
3.1 Centralized EIGAN
Performance comparison. We compare the ally and adver-
sary losses over training epochs between EIGAN, autoen-
coder, PCA, and DP on the MIMIC dataset in Fig. 3. It is
observed in (a) that EIGAN is able to match the adversary
losses of DP, while in (b) the EIGAN ally loss matches that
of PCA and autoencoder while outperforming DP by a sig-
nificant margin. Thus, EIGAN is both capable of achieving
significant privacy and maintaining the predictivity of the
encoded representations. Next, we compare EIGAN with
(Bertran et al. 2019) on the FaceScrub dataset and setting
described in their work. We empirically adjust α in (4) to
equalize the resulting adversary performances (gender pre-
diction) between the models. Tab. 1 compares the obtained
model top-5 accuracies: EIGAN has almost a 50% improve-
ment in the ally’s task of identity recognition. This validates
Model Ally (accuracy) Adv. (accuracy)
Resnet152 (baseline) 0.99 0.99on unencoded data
Resnet152 0.85 0.45
ResNext101 0.86 0.42
Resnet101 0.88 0.64
Resnet50 0.87 0.56
Table 2: Accuracy of different architectures employed to infer
ally (classification of even vs. odd) and adversary (classification of
digits) objectives on MNIST encoded using EIGAN trained using
ResNet152. We see that the ally accuracies are consistent across
network architectures, and the adversary accuracies remain signifi-
cantly below the performance on the unencoded data in each case.
our choice of optimization using cross-entropy loss in (4)
for PPRL over the technique of optimization using KL di-
vergence that is common in recent literature.
Robustness of learned representation. We next con-
sider the robustness of EIGAN’s learned representation to
ally and adversary architectures that deviate from the one
used for training. Tab. 2 shows the performance of varying
ResNet (He et al. 2016) architectures for allies and adver-
saries applied to the data encodings ouputted from training
EIGAN with ResNet152 on the MNIST dataset. We see that
the representations learned by EIGAN are able to obfus-
cate adversary targets from the other networks – ResNet101,
ResNet50, and ResNeXt101 (Xie et al. 2017) – with the ad-
versary accuracy remaining significantly below the perfor-
mance on the unencoded data. The networks chosen are of-
ficial Pytorch (Paszke et al. 2019) implementations and re-
duce the effect of implementation details on performance.
Varying ally/adversary overlap. We consider the ef-
fect of class overlap for the ally and adversary objec-
tives on model performance. To do this, we generate a 2D
dataset consisting of four Gaussians with means at (x, y) =
(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), each corresponding to one class,
and changing variances (controls the overlap). Fig. 5(c)
shows an instance of this dataset: the ally is interested in dif-
ferentiating color, while the adversary wants to differentiate
shape. Fig. 4 shows the effect of the ally label variance on
the resulting accuracies for EIGAN, the method in (Bertran
et al. 2019), and the unencoded data. As the ally variance
increases, we observe that (a) the accuracy of the adversary
Figure 6: Performance of ally and adversary objectives trained on
D-EIGAN (K = 10, φ = 0.8, δ = 2, non-i.i.d) for MIMIC in
the cases of (a) all nodes having all three objectives and (b) each
node having the ally but only one of the adversaries. We see that the
distribution of objectives does not affect performance significantly.
Figure 7: Effect of (a) aggregation frequency δ (for φ = 0.8) and
(b) sparsification factor φ (for δ = 2) on ally/adversary perfor-
mance training on D-EIGAN for non-i.i.d. setting in Fig. 6(a). The
performance is robust to both parameters showing that D-EIGAN
can be applied in communication-constrained environments.
for EIGAN remains consistently lower than that of the oth-
ers, while (b) the accuracy on the ally objective for EIGAN
remains higher than that of (Bertran et al. 2019) and is com-
parable to the unencoded case. Similar results are observed
in changing the adversary variance (see Sec. A8.1).
Varying system dimensions. We also consider the im-
pact of the encoding space dimension l and the number
of allies/adversaries considered in the minimax game on
EIGAN’s performance. We summarize our key findings
here; the detailed results can be found in Sec. A8.5&A8.6.
(i) We find that as l is increased, the training requires fewer
epochs to converge, and is able to achieve a lower testing
loss, even as l exceeds the input dimension. (ii) We observe
that the final testing loss obtained by an adversary as the
number of allies included in the optimization is varied stays
reasonably constant. A similar conclusion is drawn when in-
creasing the number of adversaries in the presence of a sin-
gle ally. Thus, EIGAN encodings are robust to the number
of objectives in preserving privacy, despite the fact that each
additional objective requires encoding more information.
3.2 Distributed EIGAN
Varying number of nodes. For the distributed case, we first
study the effect of increasing the number of training nodes
K. We use synthetic Gaussian data and generate non-i.i.d.
data distributions across the nodes by increasing the vari-
ance of the Gaussians at each subsequent node k (Fig. 5(c)
shows the distribution for k = 3). Fig. 5(a)&(b) show the re-
sulting ally and adversary accuracies obtained when trained
on D-EIGAN, on (centralized) EIGAN, and on the unen-
coded data. As K increases, the ally performance degrades
in each case, due to the higher variance for each class exhib-
ited in the overall dataset X . Overall, we see that D-EIGAN
matches the performance of the centrally-trained EIGAN in
both metrics, which shows that distributed learning can yield
a comparable solution when all parameters (φ = 1) are syn-
chronized frequently (δ = 1). Similar conclusions are drawn
when the data is i.i.d. across nodes (see Sec. A9.1).
Varying objectives across nodes. Next, we study the ef-
fect of varying ally and adversary objectives across nodes in
the network. For this, we consider the MIMIC dataset and
allocate the dataset across K = 10 nodes randomly so that
each has a different distribution of patient data. In Fig. 6,
we show the accuracies achieved by D-EIGAN on the one
ally and two adversary objectives for two cases: (a) when
each node has all three objectives, and (b) when each node
has the ally objective, but half have one adversary objective
and half have the other. The EIGAN performance on the full
dataset is included for comparison. We see that D-EIGAN in
(a) only has a slight improvement over (b) in the case of the
gender adversary, which indicates that D-EIGAN is robust to
varying node objectives, even though the aggregation period
has increased (δ = 2) and the fraction of parameters shared
has decreased (φ = 0.8) from Fig. 5. Thus, once a data sam-
ple is encoded at a node via D-EIGAN, it can be transferred
to another node and securely applied to ally tasks there even
if the objectives are different, e.g., if a patient moves to a
different hospital that has different health regulations. Simi-
lar conclusions are drawn when the data is i.i.d. across nodes
(see Sec. A9.2 of Appendix).
Varying synchronization parameters. Finally, we con-
sider the impact of the aggregation period δ and the sparsifi-
cation factor φ on D-EIGAN performance. This has implica-
tions for the communication resources required for training,
as discussed in Sec. 2.2. For this experiment, we again use
MIMIC, K = 10 nodes, and the data distributions from the
last experiment, with all nodes having all three objectives.
In Fig. 7, we show the performance of D-EIGAN as (a) δ
increases and (b) φ increases, with EIGAN shown for com-
parison. In (a), we see that D-EIGAN is robust to the num-
ber of training epochs between aggregations, implying that
it can be increased to limit the frequency of uplink trans-
missions. In (b), we similarly observe generally robust per-
formance as the fraction of sharing changes, though surpris-
ingly, the performance noticeably decreases once φ reaches
1 and all are shared. A similar effect was observed in (Sat-
tler et al. 2019), that in the case of distributed model training
over non-i.i.d. datasets, sparsification enhances performance
because it minimizes noise weights due to data bias at each
node. Indeed, in the i.i.d. case, we do not observe this effect
(see Sec. A9.3). Thus, we conclude that D-EIGAN is well
suited for communication-constrained environments.
4 Conclusion
We developed the Exclusion-Inclusion Generative Adversar-
ial Network (EIGAN) for PPRL in the presence of multi-
ple allies and adversaries with potentially overlapping ob-
jectives. We proved that for an optimal encoding, the adver-
sary’s output follows a uniform distribution, and that depen-
dencies between ally and adversary interests requires care-
ful balancing of encoder objective weights. We then pro-
posed D-EIGAN, the first distributed PPRL methodology, to
address privacy concerns and potential communication re-
strictions in scenarios with decentralized data. Our exper-
iments showed that EIGAN outperforms the state-of-the-
art in jointly optimizing predictivity and privacy for differ-
ent levels of class overlap. We also showed that D-EIGAN
achieves comparable performance to EIGAN with different
numbers of training nodes and as the synchronization pa-
rameters vary to account for communication constraints.
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A5 Propositions and Proofs
This section includes the statements and proofs of the Prop. 1 from Sec. 2.1, Prop. 2 mentioned in Sec. 2.1, Prop. 3 from
Sec. 2.2, and Prop. 4 mentioned in Sec. 2.2.
A5.1 Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Let O denote the set of all (i, j) pairs of allies Ai and adversaries Vj for which YAi ∩ YVj 6= ∅, i.e., with
overlapping interests. Given a fixed encoder E in the EIGAN architecture, ifO = ∅, the overall score in (2) is maximized when
the adversaries’ output predictions follow a uniform distribution. On the other hand, if insteadO 6= ∅, then for each overlapping
label, the architecture proposed by (2) considers the utility of the attributes that have the higher importance weight, i.e., Ai if
αAi > αVj and Vj if αAi < αVj .
Proof. Suppose YˆAi = pAi (Y |E(X )) and YˆVj = pVj (Y |E(X )). Then, the utilities in (1) can be expressed as,
u
Ai
= EY∼Y
Ai
[
log YˆAi
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
u
Vj
= EY∼Y
Vj
[
log YˆVj
]
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
(7)
Let HQ = H(P,Q) denote the cross-entropy of Q with respect to P defined as,
HQ = H(P,Q) = Ex∼P [− logQ] , (8)
then (7) can be re-stated in terms of cross-entropy:
u
Ai
= −HAi = −H(Y ∼ YAi , YˆAi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
u
Vj
= −HVj = −H(Y ∼ YVj , YˆVj ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
(9)
The maximization of ally utilities uAi and minimization of adversary utilities uVj ∀i, j in the overall optimization objective
given in (3) can be re-written as minimization of it’s negative given by,
U ′ = −
n∑
i=1
αAiuAi +
m∑
j=1
αVjuVj
=
n∑
i=1
αAiHAi −
m∑
j=1
αVjHVj .
(10)
In (10), it can be observed that the minimization occurs when entropy of allies
∑n
i=1 αAiHAi is minimized while that
of adversaries
∑m
j=1 αVjHVj is maximized. Using the general definition of entropy, each of the allies and adversaries has
a definite global optimum and can be optimized separately if their labels are non-overlapping. Note that ally and adversary
entropies are non-negative values, and given a fixed encoderE, the sum of ally entropies is minimized when individual entropies
are minimized. For each ally, individual entropy HAi is minimized when YˆAi takes the value of 1 ∀i as every ally label is
then predicted correctly. Similarly for adversaries, individual entropy HVj is maximized when YˆVj = 1/|YVj | is the uniform
distribution. Thus, it can be seen that, at the optimal solution, the adversaries’ output follows a uniform distribution, as it
minimizes the overall entropy in (10), or equivalently maximizes the utility in (3).
Given that (Ai, Vj) ∈ O is the set of all (i, j) pairs of allies Ai and adversaries Vj for which YAi ∩ YVj 6= ∅, the ally and
adversary objectives in (10) are overlapping if O 6= ∅.
Given that the encoder is fixed, for allies/adversaries not included in O, the associated utilities can be independently opti-
mized. We are thus left with the maximization of the following,
UO =
∑
(Ai,Vj)∈O
αAi · uAi − αVj · uVj , (11)
where we index (Ai, Vj) ∈ O by i. Note YAi(c) = YVi(c) ∀c ∈ Ci ∀i;, where Ci is the set of indices of elements in
YAi ∩ YVi 6= ∅. Since both the ally and adversary network try to predict the same label (i.e. uAi(c) = uVj (c)), we can simplify
(11) as follows:
UO =
∑
(Ai,Vj)∈O

∑
c∈C
(αAi − αVj ) · uAi(c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
overlapping labels
+
∑
c/∈C
αAi · uAi(c)− αVj · uVj (c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-overlapping labels
. (12)
The utility values given in (12) reward only one of the two discriminators predicting on overlapping label Y ∼ YAi if αAi 6= αVj
for (Ai, Vj) ∈ O. If αAi = αVj for (Ai, Vj) ∈ O, then UO = 0, and no optimization occurs with respect to the overlapping
labels in Y ∼ YAi .
A5.2 Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Assume that the number of labels of interest is the same among all the allies and adversaries. For any adversary
Vj , the distribution of its prediction over his set of labels of interest does not follow a uniform distribution if sufficient weight is
given to the ally utilities (i.e., αAi , ∀Ai, is sufficiently large) and the distribution of prediction of one ally, such as that of the
ally Ai, can be defined as a linear combination of distribution of predictions of Vj and that of other allies/adversaries.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider a system with one ally network with a scalar output YˆcA and m adversary networks
with scalar outputs YˆcVj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The true distribution of each predicted output is YcA for the ally and YcVj for the
adversaries, and YcA and YcVj are the actual labels drawn from those distributions respectively. The true values and predictions
between that of the ally and the adversaries have the relation:
YcA =
m∑
j=1
wjYcVj , YˆcA =
m∑
j=1
wj YˆcVj , (13)
where wj is a scaling weight. The cross entropy of the entire system is given by:
U = αAYcA log(YˆcA)−
m∑
j=1
αVjYcVj log(YˆcVj ) (14)
Optimizing for the output of a specific adversary network Vn, we obtain:
YˆcVn =
∑
j 6=n wj YˆcVj
αAYcAwn
(
1
αVnYcVn
− 1
αAYcA
)−1
(15)
Notably, YˆcVn only returns a non-uniform distribution when:
αVnYcVn < αAYcA (16)
If the weight αA is not sufficiently large enough to maintain the inequality in (16), the value of YˆcVn will not be obtainable
via (15) and will have a uniform distribution. If αVnYcVn = αAYcA , then the cross entropy of (14) will have a value of zero and
no optimization will take place.
A5.3 Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Given a set of fixed encoders in the D-EIGAN architecture, if all the nodes have the same number of allies and
adversaries with the same sets of target labels YA(k) = YA(k′) and YV (k) = YV (k′) , 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K, then Prop. 1 holds for all
the allies and adversaries belonging to different nodes if the local datasets at each node are i.i.d.
Proof. Given that the global encoder is the average of the local encoders in the federated learning procedure for a single
synchronization across K local nodes, the maximization of expectation in (6) can be described as the maximization of ally
utilities and minimization of adversary utilities given by:
U =
1
K
K∑
k=1
n(k)∑
i=1
α
A
(k)
i
u
A
(k)
i
−
m(k)∑
j=1
α
V
(k)
j
u
V
(k)
j
 (17)
In (17), Ai(k) and Vi(k) refer to the ith ally or adversary of the kth local node for the allies and adversaries respectively.
Because data at each local node is i.i.d, the distributions Y are the same at each node, and thus each node has the same objective
function. Then, taking the result from Proposition 1 and assuming that Ai(k1) , Vj(k1) = Ai(k2) , Vj(k2) ∀i, j, k1 6= k2 (the ally
and adversary labels are selected the same across all nodes), the output of the adversaries at each local node follow a uniform
distribution.
The ally and adversary objectives in (17) are overlapping if O 6= ∅ given that (Ai, Vj) ∈ O is the set of all Ai, Vj pairs
for which YAi = YVj . Given that each of the local nodes have the same overlapping ally and adversary labels with potentially
different reward rates αA
i(k)
and αV
j(k)
, and their utilities can be expressed in terms of entropy as in (9), the final optimization
of the distributed system can be expressed as the minimization of entropy:
UO =
∑
(Ai,Vj)∈O
(
K∑
k=1
(α
A
(k)
i
− α
V
(k)
j
) · uAki
)
(18)
The entropy values given in (18) reward only one of the two discriminators predicting on label YAi if
∑K
k=1 αA(k)i
6=∑k
k=1 αV (k)i
. If
∑K
k=1 αA(k)i
=
∑K
k=1 αV (k)i
, these two networks have no contribution to UO, and no optimization occurs
regarding Ai and Vj .
A5.4 Proposition 4
Proposition 4. If the allies and adversaries located at the K nodes of D-EIGAN have non-overlapping target sets, i.e.,
YA(k) 6= YA(k′) and YV (k) 6= YV (k′) , 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K, then individual encoders under D-EIGAN consider the union of these
local allies,
⋃K
k=1 YA(k) , and adversaries ,
⋃K
k=1 YV (k) for optimization as a result of the global aggregation step. The weights
α
A
(k)
i
’s and α
V
(k)
i
’s associated with the allies/adversaries are scaled by the ratio of the number of nodes that implement them
locally to total number of nodes.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider a two network D-EIGAN. Let node 1 consider 3 objectives, namely, YAc , YA1 and
YV1 corresponding to 2 allies and 1 adversary. Similarly, let node 2 with two allies and one adversary consider 3 objectives, one
of which is common: YAc , YA2 and YV2 , such that the objective YAc is common among them and the rest are different.
Utilities of individual nodes can be calculated using (3), given by
U (1) = αAc · uAc + αA1 · uA1 − αV1 · uV1 , (19)
U (2) = αAc · uAc + αA2 · uA2 − αV2 · uV2 . (20)
Under federated training, the equivalent loss function that is optimized by the D-EIGAN system can be calculated using (6),
given by,
U = αAc · uAc +
αA1
2
· uA1 −
αV1
2
· uV1 +
αA2
2
· uA2 −
αV2
2
· uV2 , (21)
which shows that the overall objective under D-EIGAN considers all the objectives, but the associated weights are lower for
non-common allies/adversaries. In contrast to a D-EIGAN where all allies and adversaries are common across nodes, the
difference is the associated weights of individual objectives.
A6 Pseudocode
In this section, Algorithm A1 presents the step-by-step implementation of EIGAN training. It is an iterative mini-batch stochas-
tic gradient descent in which we update weights for encoder and allies/adversaries alternately until convergence. Learning rates
for encoder, allies and adversaries are controlled using parameters ηE , ηA, and ηV .
Algorithm A1 EIGAN training
Notations:
• (·)j denotes the value for the jth minibatch
• LAi denotes the loss of ally Ai
• LVi denotes the loss of the adversary Vi
• ηE , ηA , and ηV denote the learning rates of the encoders, allies and adversaries
Training:
• initialize α used in loss function (4);
• initialize θAi ’s and θVj ’s and θE to start the training;
for number of training epochs do
• Sample a minibatch set J of data points and ally/adversary labels from dataset, X .
• Compute encoder loss using (4): LE = 1|J|
∑
j∈J (LE)j
• Update encoder parameters: θE ← θE − ηE · ∇θELE
• Compute allies/adversaries losses using (4):
LAi = − 1|J|
∑
j∈J (LAi)j , LVi = − 1|J|
∑
j∈J (LVi)j
• Update local allies/adversaries parameters:
θAi ← θAi − ηA · ∇θAiLAi , θVi ← θVi − ηV · ∇θViLVi
end for
A7 Additional Proof of Concept Visualizations
In this section, include additional proof of concept visualizations beyond those presented in Fig 2 from Sec. 2.1.
The first experiment uses a synthetic dataset comprising 4 sets of Gaussian distributed points in 2-D around the means (-0.5,
-0.5), (-0.5, 1.5), (1.5, -1.5) and (1.5, 1.5) as shown in Fig. A8(a). We implement EIGAN with the ally objective to distinguish
between reds and blues and adversary objective to segregate x’s and o’s. This is the simplest case we consider, as there is a single
ally and single adversary, each with binary labels. Decision boundaries are linear. We thus use logistic regression classifier as
it has a convex loss function. The encoder is a neural network with a single hidden layer and output size, l = 2. The learnt
representation in Fig. A8(b) is intuitive: It maintains linear separability among ally classes, i.e., reds vs blues but ensures a
collapse of adversary classes.
Figure A8: (a) Quadrant dataset with four groups of points, one ally, and one adversary. The points are linearly separable with regard to the
ally’s (classifying reds/blues) and an adversary’s (classifying x’s/o’s) objectives. (b) EIGAN learns a representation that collapses the axes
along the adversary’s objective while enhancing separation along the ally’s.
Next we consider a dataset with non-linear decision boundary as shown in Fig. A9 (a). The ally is interested in a decision
boundary between the red and the blue circle, while the adversary is interested in upper vs lower semicircle, i.e., x’s vs o’s.
The same encoder is used as in the previous experiment. We use a neural network with a single hidden layer as the ally and
adversary because ally’s decision boundary is not linearly separable. Fig. A9(b) shows the learnt representation , which achieves
a separability in the encoded space that is qualitatively similar to the representation learnt in Fig. A8(b).
Figure A9: (a) Circle dataset with the same objectives as Figure A8 but ally classes (reds vs blues) are not linearly separable. (b) EIGAN
learns a similar transformation, making the ally’s classification task linearly separable.
Figure A10: (a) Octant dataset with eight groups of points, one ally, and two adversaries. The ally is interested in classifying reds/blues
while the adversaries are interested in separation along other axes. (b) EIGAN collapses the two adversary dimensions while maintaining
separability for the ally.
For the final experiment, we extend EIGAN from single ally and single adversary to multiple allies and adversaries. We
consider two different cases: EIGAN with (i) 2 ally and 1 adversary objective, and (ii) 1 ally and 2 adversaries presented in
Fig. A10. Case (i) is what was presented in Fig. 2 of Sec. 2.1. In the case (ii), we have 8 set of Gaussian distributed points, one
in each octant as shown in Fig. A10(a). The ally wants to separate reds vs blues, and the adversaries want to separate along the
other axes, i.e., top vs bottom (adversary 1) and squares and stars vs x’s and o’s (adversary 2). The learnt representation only
preserves ally’s dimension of variation, i.e. reds vs blues. All the other dimensions are collapsed.
A8 Additional EIGAN Experiments
Figure A11: Effect of change in ally overlap (a-b) and adversary overlap (c-d) on the performance of EIGAN, and its comparison with the
unencoded data as well as the method in Bertran et al. (Bertran et al. 2019). EIGAN is able to consistently outperform both baselines on the
adversary objective, and obtains performance close to the unencoded data for the ally.
A8.1 Comparison with the method in (Bertran et al. 2019)
Fig. 4 from Sec 3.1 presented a comparison of (Bertran et al. 2019) with EIGAN on synthetic Gaussian data. Fig A11 is the
extended version, presenting additionally the comparison of (c) adversary and (d) ally performance as we alter the class overlap
between adversary labels. Consistent with the conclusions presented in Sec 3.1 for the ally variation, EIGAN outperforms
Bertran et al. consistently as the adversary exhibits more variance. The p-values of the improvements EIGAN makes over the
method in (Bertran et al. 2019) are below 0.002 in all 16 cases of boxplot comparisons.
Figure A12: Predictivity and privacy comparison between EIGAN and the baselines across one ally and two adversaries on the MIMIC-III
dataset. (a) On the adversary objectives (gender prediction, solid lines and race prediction, dashed lines) EIGAN matches DP’s performance
(by design of the experiment, as determined by the selection of the DP  parameter). Hence, the red and the khaki colored curves overlap. (b)
On the ally objective (survival prediction), EIGAN achieves noticeable improvement over the baselines. (c) EIGAN training converges after
initial oscillations corresponding to the minimax game.
A8.2 Comparison on MIMIC-III
Here we present the extended results of Fig 3 from Sec. 3.1 which compared EIGAN against baselines on the MIMIC dataset.
Fig A12(c) shows the loss progression of encoder and adversary as the EIGAN training proceeds. It can be observed that
increase/decrease in encoder loss is corresponding to the decrease/increase in adversary loss during the same epoch, consistent
with the definition of the encoder loss in (4). The magnitude of the oscillations decreases as we progress through the training
and eventually the networks (players in the game) reach a steady state.
Figure A13: Predictivity and privacy comparison between EIGAN and the baselines across one ally and two adversaries on the Titanic
dataset. (a) On one of the adversary objectives (gender prediction, solid lines) EIGAN matches DP’s performance (by design of the experiment,
as determined by the selection of the DP  parameter), but in this case it does not match the other adversary prediction (passenger class
prediction, dashed lines), which could be matched for another value of . (b) On the ally objective (survival prediction), EIGAN achieves
marginal improvement over the the baseline Autoencoder. (c) EIGAN training converges after initial oscillations corresponding to the minimax
game.
Algorithm Ally Adversary 1 Adversary 2(Survival) (Gender) (P-Class)
Autoencoder 0.6333 0.4918 0.7351
PCA 0.6439 0.5236 0.7289
DP 0.6869 0.5733 0.7904
EIGAN 0.6396 0.5444 0.8011
Table 3: Comparison of log-loss achieved on the test set between the algorithms for the Titanic dataset. EIGAN matches autoencoder on the
ally and performs slightly better than DP on adversary 2, while slightly worse on adversary 1.
A8.3 Comparison on Titanic dataset
For completeness, we also evaluate EIGAN algorithm on another dataset, Titanic, which consists of data listing the details
of roughly 800 of the passengers that were onboard the Titanic ship. This experiment aims at understanding the convergence
behaviour of EIGAN under limited training data.
Similar to result on MIMIC-III from Fig A12, Fig A13 (a) shows that while EIGAN is able to perform as well or nearly as
well as any of the baselines on adversary obfuscation, (b) it obtains the best predictivity on ally objective. (c) shows that the
training reaches a steady-state.
Table 3 summarizes the loss-values of the trained allies/adversaries on encoded data using different techniques. It can be
seen that while EIGAN is able to match DP’s performance on adversary 2, it performs marginally worse than it on adversary 2,
while having a considerable gain on the corresponding ally.
Figure A14: Comparison across one ally and two adversaries on the MNIST dataset. The (a) adversary objective (odd-even prediction,
a binary classification with virtually identical trends) converge to roughly the same loss for each algorithm, and (b) ally objective (digit
prediction, 10-class classification). With dependencies (in particular, partial overlaps) between the ally and adversary objectives, EIGAN
training in (c) is unable to fully converge, consistent with Prop. 2.
A8.4 Comparison on MNIST
We also conduct an experiment using the popular MNIST dataset of handwritten digits to validate the findings in Prop. 1&2
when dependencies exist between the ally and adversary objectives. In this case, we use digit recognition (0-9) as the ally
objective and even vs odd as adversary objective, which exhibits a clear dependence because if someone could recover the digit
(ally objective), then inferring odd-vs-even (adversary objective) becomes trivial. Formally, referring to the propositions, we
have Yodd = Y1 +Y3 + · · ·+Y9 and Yeven = 1−Yodd where Y(·) is the true probability distribution on the labels and thus can
be added. Similarly, Yˆodd = Yˆ1+ Yˆ3+ · · ·+ Yˆ9 and Yˆeven = 1− Yˆodd, where Yˆ(·) are probabilities of correct predictions. Prop. 2
follows when we substitute these in (15), i.e. the adversary is not forces to a follow uniform distribution if sufficient weight is
given to the ally.
Fig A14 shows the result of this experiment, where the weights of the allies and adversaries are set equal. (a) shows that the
adversary is not able to achieve any separation from Autoencoders or PCA which is unintended. Observing (c) we realize that
the training process does not reach a steady state-convergence point, consistent with the propositions.
Figure A15: Effect of the number of adversaries on the testing loss achievable by an ally (admission type prediction) under EIGAN for
the MIMIC-III dataset. The adversary objectives are chosen from different attributes of the source data. The achievable loss is reasonably
constant and significantly improved from what the ally can achieve on the original data.
Figure A16: EIGAN’s effect of the number of allies on the testing loss achievable by an adversary (admission type prediction) for MIMIC-
III. The ally objectives are chosen as different attributes from the source. The achievable loss is reasonably constant (not decreasing) and
significantly higher than what the adversary can achieve on the original data.
A8.5 Varying Number of Networks
This section includes results that were mentioned in Sec. 3.1 for varying the number of allies and adversaries under the dis-
cussion varying system dimensions. Fig. A15 considers the effect of the number of adversaries on the attainable loss of an
ally. We observe that the loss which can be achieved by the ally is significantly lower (over 10%) than what it can obtain on
Figure A17: Heatmap of Pearson correlation coefficients between the different objectives used in the experiment to compare the effect
of number of allies on a single adversary’s performance, and vice versa, for the MIMIC-III dataset. Here admission type is the target kept
constant while progressively increasing the number of labels to see the performance on this constant label set. We observe that the overall
performance is not significantly affected by mild correlations. Interestingly, the dip in Fig. A16 on addition of 9th ally corresponds to addition
of label admission location which has a comparatively higher correlation with admission type.
the original (unencoded) data regardless of the number of adversaries. Also, this loss is reasonably constant (as opposed to
decreasing) as the number of adversaries increases. Thus, EIGAN encodings are robust to the number of adversary objectives
in preserving privacy, despite the fact that each ally requires EIGAN to encode additional information about the source dataset
in its representation.
A similar conclusion can be drawn when increasing the number of allies in the presence of an adversary, namely, the adversary
loss does is not affected significantly in Fig. A16. The exception to this is the small dip in adversary loss at the 9th ally point.
which can be explained by the fact that this attribute is highly correlated with the adversary attribute, as can be seen in the
correlation matrix presented in Fig. A17. This is consistent with the behavior of overlapping interests discussed in Prop. 1&2.
Figure A18: Effect of EIGAN’s encoding dimension space on the number of training epochs required to reach within 1% of training loss
convergence (left axis) and the achieved final testing loss (right axis) for MIMIC-III. The achieved loss decreases sharply as the dimension
increases, emphasizing a tradeoff between model quality and the memory needed for the encoded data. In fact, beyond the right end of the
X-axis value, the model runs out of memory on our high performance machine. (Dashed curves are fit using weighted moving averages.)
Figure A19: Effect of EIGAN’s encoding dimension space on the number of training epochs required to reach within 1% of training loss
convergence (left axis) and the achieved final testing loss (right axis) for the Titanic dataset. The achieved loss decreases sharply as the
dimension increases, emphasizing a tradeoff between model quality and required memory. (Dashed curves are fit using weighted moving
averages.)
A8.6 Varying Encoder Dimensionality
Under varying system dimensions, in Sec. 3.1, we also discussed the effect of varying the encoder dimensionality. Fig. A18
depicts the results for the MIMIC-III dataset while Fig. A19 depicts the result of a similar experiment on Titanic dataset. In the
two experiments, as dimension of output of the encoder, l is increased, we observe that the training mostly requires fewer epochs
to converge and is able to achieve a lower encoder testing loss. This could be explained by the fact that larger networks (i.e.
more number of trainable parameters) have more degrees of freedom in training. Interestingly, while there is some variation, the
test loss continues to decrease beyond d, the original dimension of the data samples, i.e., when l ≥ d. The relevant consideration
with EIGAN, then, appears to be the tradeoff between encoding quality, as measured by the encoding space dimension, and the
memory required for training the encoder, which increases with the dimension of the encoder.
A9 Additional D-EIGAN Experiments
Figure A20: Comparison of (a) adversary and (b) ally performance using synthetic Gaussian data while increasing the number of nodes and
sharing all the model weights (φ = 1) after every minibatch (δ = 1) during federated training. The distribution of data is i.i.d. across the
nodes, which is obtained by generating Gaussian data with constant mean and variance across nodes. It can be observed that EIGAN and
D-EIGAN converge to similar performances regardless of the number of nodes.
A9.1 Varying Number of Nodes
Fig. 5 from Sec. 3.2 presented the effect of varying the number of nodes on D-EIGAN performance when the nodes have
non-i.i.d data distributions. Fig. A20 shows the result of the experiment when the nodes instead have i.i.d data. We observe that
the performance of the ally and adversary remains reasonably constant (and similar to EIGAN) as we increase the number of
nodes under D-EIGAN. From the two experiments, we can conclude that D-EIGAN can readily extend to scenarios where data
is distributed over larger number of nodes without sacrificing the performance on ally and adversary objectives.
Figure A21: Comparison of distributed (K = 2 nodes) EIGAN with centralized EIGAN. Survival is the ally objective, and gender and race
are the chosen adversary objectives for the experiment. (a) Training of distributed EIGAN involves same adversary objectives, i.e., obfuscating
gender and race across the both the nodes. (b) Each node has a different adversary objective, while they share the same ally objective.
A9.2 Varying Objectives across Nodes
Fig. A21 is an addition to results presented in Fig. 6 from Sec. 3.2. In this experiment we consider the same dataset with the
same set of ally and adversary objectives over i.i.d datasets on 2 nodes instead of non-i.i.d datasets on 10 nodes. Survival is the
ally objective while, gender and race are adversary objectives. We consider two scenarios: in (a) gender and race are common
adversaries across the two nodes, while in (b) gender is the adversary on one node and race is the adversary on the other node
(i.e. different objectives on different nodes). We observe the performance of D-EIGAN is comparable to that of EIGAN in
the case where the data is centralized. This observed behavior, i.e., that a privacy and/or predictivity objective at one node is
adopted across all the encoders is the realization of Prop. 4.
Figure A22: Effect of varying (a) frequency of sync (δ, measured in terms of number of epochs between parameter sharing) and (b) fraction
of parameters uploaded/downloaded (φ) on a distributed implementation consisting of K = 2 nodes. The results shows that as the frequency
of sync/fraction of parameters shared increases, the performance of the system on hiding the sensitive variable is increased considerably,
while there is little effect on the ally convergence.
A9.3 Varying Synchronization parameters
This section extends the results discussed in Sec. 3.2 under varying synchronization parameters. To understand the effect of
fractional parameter sharing, we evaluate it on i.i.d datasets over 2 nodes using the synthetic Gaussian dataset in Sec. 3.2. The
data has unbalanced classes, so we compare f1-score instead of accuracy. The result is shown in Fig. A22: We see that unlike the
trend on the non-i.i.d case, there is no visible benefit of sharing only a fraction of parameters, as seen in Fig. A22(b). Similarly,
in (a) it can be observed that performance over the adversary degrades as the frequency of sync is decreased, i.e., number of
epochs between aggregation in increased. Hence, the properties observed upon having non-i.i.d data distributions in Sec. 3.2,
do not hold when handling i.i.d data. This is because the reduction in model bias is not desirable in the case of i.i.d.
